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Panelists' Comments
COMMENTS BY RICHARD H.

KUH*

Thank you Professor Batt, Professor Kamisar, fellow panelists,
honored guests and friends.
I have been a prosecutor for about twelve years and until
Professor Kamisar's remarks this morning, I had never previously
heard myself spoken of as a hunter. If I am to be spoken of as a
hunter, I'm darned glad it is in Dan Boone country. It might be
less popular in my own city of New York.
Now your principal speaker, Yale, and I have been friends for
many years. Despite a warm friendship, I don't think we have
ever found anything we have agreed upon in these many years.
Indeed, I met Yale on the plane in Cincinnati and we flew down
here together. I think the stewardess was a little bit fearful that
there would be a mid-air explosion. There was none and we both
got here. So as to any remarks that I may make about Yale's paper
-I know Yale is prepared to have me disagree with him-I hope
that all of you will recognize they are not meant in any fashion to
intrude on your graciousness and the hospitality that you've shown
both sides of the fence.
Yale's paper-to my mind-is a magnificent, indeed I would say
a monumental example of the constitutional inability of many
law professors and indeed, I am sorry to say, many appellate judges,
and critics of prosecutors and of police, to even momentarily
place themselves in the role of a policeman or a prosecutor.
And certainly the Attorney General of the United States is
a prosecutor, as the number one law enforcement agent in this
country. I think when we analyze, and criticize, and pick at what
somebody has to say, we have an obligation in so doing to at least
momentarily place ourselves in his shoes, and to say "what would
I do had I that position." I urge that this is something that law professors and judges should do when they criticize law enforcement.
Indeed, a prosecutor worth his salt must, in every case that he tries,
0
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project and say, "What will defense counsel do? Can I momentarily
stand in his shoes and anticipate and see the logic or the illogic
of what he does"?
What was the Attorney General's position last summer when he
wrote this horrendous letter? He was faced with Escobedo having
been the law for a year. He was faced with the existence-the happy
existence-of a group of distinguished judges, law professors and
a few police and prosecutors, in the American Law Institute, who
were trying to put together a reasonable method, a method that
would be fair to defendants and also fair to the people in the
community, a method of protecting a defendant's rights and at
the same time protecting the community. And I suggest to you
that there were four cards, if I may talk in terms of a partial poker
game, when this thing started that he had to keep in his hand.
There were four facts that he had to face; then he proceeded
from those four cards, those four facts.
What were the four cards?
One: Escobedo was the law. There is much speculation as to
how broad Escobedo is, or how broad it isn't, but I think that one
thing is clear: at the very least, Escobedo does say that if a defendant says, "Mr. Policeman, may I have a lawyer?," or if a
lawyer is knocking at the station house door and saying "You've
got my client up there and I want to talk to him," at the very
least, at that point there may be no more questioning. So that's
card number one. This is and was the law, regardless of whether
warnings have to be given or not. That much was clear: a request
to see counsel, or a request by counsel to see the defendant having
been made, then questioning had to stop.
Card number two: This rule of law was not premised on
general judicial supervision over the acts of policemen, or on any
generalities. It was placed on constitutional grounds; namely, that
the right to counsel-the sixth amendment-provided that defendants had the right to counsel, and that that right apparetly
started at least at the station house, and for all we know, before. (I guess, probably, if the defendant, at the moment he was
apprehended said, "Say, boys, I'd like to see my lawyer," under
Escobedo that request would have to be honored at that point.)
That's the second card: Escobedo rests on constitutional grounds,
and hence is beyond the power of legislation to overturn.
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The third card: Legislation, some sort of model legislation, was
then being drafted by the American Law Institute, by the American Bar Association, by other groups that would (as I have suggested) create some balance-some adequate protection for the
community while at the same time fairly protecting the defendant's rights.
And the fourth card and the ace card-if I may call it that-the
most important card that the Attorney General faced, was, I assume his own conviction (and what is certainly my conviction, my
solid and firm conviction) that interrogation of defendants in
many, many cases, a statistically significant number of cases, was
absolutely, unequivocally necessary. To phrase this card a little
more crudely: that the Supreme Court, if you will, was wrong.
The Justices of the Supreme Court, or at least five of the nine
Justices, indicated-and let me quote Mr. Justice Goldberg, and
this is from the majority opinion in Escobedo: "a system of
criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the confession will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to
abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation." That quote suggests-I grant it doesn't quite say it-but suggests, and others have
said it, other appellate judges, and othe rlaw professors, and
other newspaper commentators, that if only police will work a
little harder they can get this extrinsic evidence; that really, really
there is no need for confessions; all we need is a policeman who
will be a policeman instead of a third-degreer under the bright
lights, if you will.
I suggest to you that that conclusion is absolutely false. There
is no nice way of putting it. Now, I'm a prosecutor, and I'm
opinionated, and I'm not objective, and all that. Let me therefore discuss that with you just a moment-a little excursion.
I will concede (and there are police and prosecutors who won't
concede this) that there are many cases in which police do rely on
interrogation and cease doing proper investigation. How often has
an assistant prosecutor in any county asked a policeman what he
turned up (when the assistant first has the case to prepare for
trial) and the cop says, "Gee, he made a full confession. I stopped
there. No need for anything else. Hell, he admitted it." This
happens, this is deplorable, this shouldn't happen, and it does
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happen, and I do concede that there are many instances when
police could go a step further and could get evidence other than
confessions. Having said that-and having shown you how objective I am-now let me make some further comment about it.
I think that to expect police to push beyond the confession in
every case loses track-and I'm sorry I don't know Kentucky as well
as I should but I do know something about New York-of the
fact that there are tens, nay hundreds of thousands of cases
a year, and a police force in our city, the largest force in the
country, of 27,000 men to man the city in three shifts round the
clock. And I suggest to you that every time my apartment is broken
into, or Yale comes to New York and is mugged, or somebody's
wife gets attacked and is raped, you cannot have 27,000 policemen
working around the clock on that investigation. Shortcuts are
necessary. I'd be delighted if they weren't. The only alternative, of
course, to recognizing the need for shortcuts is to have instead of
27,000 policemen, 54,000 policemen or 108,000 policemen and
then each cop could put in twice or four times as much time on
every case. Of course you couldn't recruit them, you couldn't pay
them and if the fear is of a police state, I suggest that having
four cops on each comer instead of one might make us look more
like the "Dominican Republic," let us say, then New York City.
And so I don't think the answer is to multiply our police force. I
think it is to recognize that there are times when shortcuts will be
needed. Nay indeed, I even know of law professors who have
used short answer exams because its a shortcut to marking papers.
(Interjection by Mr. Kamisar: "You struck a chord there.")
Now, put aside the need for shortcuts, let me get further into
this interrogation miasma. There are cases which no matter how
deeply investigated, no matter how completely not a stone is left
unturned, in which no clue will be found without interrogation.
Let me give two that very many of you here have read about, two
current cases.

New York has just convicted a defendant named Richard
Robles of two murders that, at least in my time in prosecution, I
know of no crimes that so shocked any city. Two girls, one (the
niece of a famous man), Janice Wylie, and her roommate, Emily
Hoffert, were killed, their nude bodies trussed up, horribly
slashed, were found in their apartment. And this wasn't an
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apartment in the part of town that I live in. This was an apartment in one of New York's most fashionable, best protected,
loveliest neighborhoods. Indeed, an apartment in which there was
a protective doorman downstairs. Suddenly our city felt, and I am
told the country felt, if this murder can take place on those wellguarded premises, nobody is safe from the crime wave. Nobody is
safe. And so I tell you without any fear that anyone can contradict
me, there wasn't a stone left unturned in that investigation. More
cops were put on that investigation than it could possibly justify.
"Screwball" leads of the strangest kind were followed and followed
vigorously. Good cops, high ranking policemen, inspectors, captains, etc. were handling this investigation. It was no sloppy hurried investigation. And I ask you, with all of that, what turned
up? You know what turned up: at first, the interrogation, and
an alleged confession, from the wrong man, one Whitmore. Shocking? But it was the only evidence. And on that evidence, Whitmore
was indicted. Happily, he didn't get near being tried; he was cleared long before trial. Second: Richard Robles was linked to the
crime by two types of interrogation. The first type was one in
which an informer came forward (and all civil libertarians know
what "finks" informers are, and how terrible it is that prosecutors
rely on informers, and many people would strip us of relying on
informers by insisting that all informers be exposed-possibly
having them killed-but that's another panel discussion). But the
state's evidence against Robles was produced when an informer
came forward and, whatever his motives, was equipped with
certain secret recording equipment and then in effect, he, acting as
an agent of the police, interrogated Richard Robles. And so this
was one type of interrogation-and interrogation it was-that was
used in evidence and helped convict Robles. The second type
of interrogation was face-to-face police interrogation. And there
was testimony to it and that convicted Robles. Thus the only evidence, virtually against Robles was these two types of interrogation
-and then, having gotten the story, certain things that tended to
corroborate the confessions. And how long was that jury out after
a seven week trial? An afternoon. It came back and convicted
the defendant of murder-two murders-in the first degree. I suggest to you that here is the classical case, the case showing both the
weakness of the confession, namely the Whitmore confession, and
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the case showing the need for confessions, the case that should tell
the Supreme Court, you cannot say, "Fellows, work a little harder,
and you won't need that confession."
Let me give you one more case, another classical case. The
New Yorker magazine in September and October of this year
[1965] had a serialized version of Truman Capote's story, (that
will shortly appear as a book) called In Cold Blood, dealing
with the murder in Kansas of an entire family-husband, wife, and
two teen-age youngsters. (I hope you all have read it, and any of
you that haven't, I recommend it to you. And I'm not in the book
selling business.) I never knew Mr. Capote, and I don't know what
his background was in crime before this, but I venture to say that,
as a member of our literary set, he was not prosecution-police
minded-if he was, he was most exceptional. He nonetheless, writes
what I have found to be a most sympathetic picture of police:
Kansas state police, some from the FBI, local police, and sheriffs,
working themselves blue in the face, hunting for clues in this
shocking murder and coming up with virtually-there were
some clues, but virtually-nothing. Virtually nothing that is
until (a) again, an informant appeared upon the scene (one of
these "horrible" creatures), and then (b) on the basis of the informant having given certain tips, diligent follow-up produced
two defendants. The two defendants made full and detailed confessions, and these confessions contained within them information
that was subject to corroboration. The defendants were convicted
and ultimately hung. I suggest to you that if you read that story
with a balanced eye, you will see that here again is a story of a
horrendous murder showing the need, the need for reasonable,
not coercive, but reasonable interrogation. Argument One.
Argument Two: If I say, positively, "Interrogation is needed,"
some of you will say "Sure, you can pick and choose a few cases,
but you don't prove a point by isolated cases." I say it is important,
when you get shocking cases like these, important to the protection
of the public and important to the confidence of the public in
their police, that they be solved. Indeed it is important to the
confidence of the public, not only in police, but in the courts.
What would the confidence of the public be in the courts if in
the Robles case, if in this quadruple Kansas murder case, in case
after case, the public picked up their paper and read that the right
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man had been arrested but, oh well, he must be turned loose because we cannot use against him the voluntary statement that he
made. (We are talking now about voluntary statements only.) I
suggest that even these few cases prove my point.
But let's go beyond the few cases. You heard Yale Kamisar cite
Judge Sobel's statistics. As all judges, Judge Sobel is a very estimable gentleman, but that doesn't mean that he does not-like
others-have his biases. I suggest to you that just three days ago
someone-also with biases-my former boss (I'm former, he's still
boss), the New York County District Attorney, Frank S. Hogan,
gave some figures suggesting that 68 per cent of 91 murder cases
then pending in New York County involved confessions, and that
in 27 per cent of the cases he couldn't have even gotten an indictment (and one doesn't require an awful lot, actually, for an
indictment) , without using these confessions! But let me stick with
Judge Sobel's figures. Suppose in only ten per cent of the casesand I could talk here to you for an hour showing you the holes in
Judge Sobel's figures-but let's assume he's right and in only ten
per cent of the cases do you need confessions. Ten per cent of the
crimes may not mean much to us sitting in this room, but if we
are the tenth man who gets mugged on the way home tonight we
might b ea little happier that there are ways of arresting and convicting that person who mugged us and not to be told by Judge
Sobel, "Oh you are only the one of ten. Your fellow won't be
convicted. Maybe we'll catch him when he muggs somebody else."
I suggest to you that is not very satisfying. Ten per cent, in short, is
a statistically significant figure. My own experience suggests a
realistic figure would be more like sixty per cent.
And the last argument I advance in urging that confessions
must be used, why they are absolutely necessary, is simply common
sense. Murderers, rapists, muggers, burglars don't commit their
crimes in front of this esteemed audience. They do it in quiet, they
do it in silence, they do it with either no one present or with only
the victim, and the victim is often rattled, injured, and his testimony is frequently questionable at best.
What are the four cards, then, that the Attorney General,
Nicholas Katzenbach, had in his hand when he decided to write
his letter to Judge Bazelon? (1) The card that at least he was
convinced that confessions were absolutely necessary-fairly, non-
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coercively obtained confessions; (2) The Supreme Court had said
that when a request was made by either counsel or by the defendant, that confession couldn't be used; (3) This ruling rested
on constitutional grounds that could not be overturned by statute;
(4) Reasonable statutes where then in process of preparation and
might, within the next six months or year, be released.
Now what does a man do getting into his shoes, what does one
do in that position? One says, "All right, there's something that's
over and done with. I can't make the Court turn back the clock.
I can't repeal, in any way, what they have done. Once a defendant
asks for a lawyer, once the lawyer asks for him, he gets it. But let
me limit it to these facts." And I suggest to you that that's all the
Katzenbach letter was. It was an effort on his part to limit Escobedo to the facts of Escobedo. And he did a damned good lawyerlike job in doing it. He made arguments that apparently convinced
much of the press. Yale Kamisar bewails that. I don't bewail that.
In arguments that I found, with my pre-conditioning, fairly convincing arguments, that took an hour to be "nit-picked" at
here and hopefully knocked down and I'm not sure how successfully. So that I suggest to you that if Yale had been in the
Attorney General's boots, maybe he would have done just what
Mr. Katzenbach did.
I do think that I owe it to you to give just a minute or two of
my own interpretation of what might be done.
As a prosecutor of about twelve years standing, I agree with
Yale that it's a pretty shoddy business, and something that shocks
me, when the poor stupid "glom," the "dope" who gets picked
up and doesn't know his rights and has nobody representing him,
can be interrogated, and the really dangerous man who as been in
jail six times before, and beaten five other cases and hence knows
his rights (better than I as a lawyer know them), when he is
picked up, he says, "Oh, I want counsel." Of course he knows that
the moment counsel is there he's got somebody else running interference for him, and not a word will be said. I think that's shocking. The idea that the "dope" gets one brand of justice and the
"sophisticated bum" gets another, bothers the daylights out of
me.
There are only three ways of dealing with this, however, and
I think Mr. Katzenbach picked the most realistic one.

1966]

PANELISTS' COMUNTS

One way-his way-is to limit the case to its facts and say,
"O.K., in these cases we can't use the confession, but let's not
extend that rule."
The second way, one that I would like to see used, but I doubt
that I'll see in the next five years, (though I expect I may see it in
ten or fifteen would be by constitutional amendment to come
right to grips with the need for interrogation, and by a constitutional amendment to modify the fifth and sixth amendments to
permit reasonable noncoercive interrogation of defendants, either
in the absence of counsel but with other safeguards, or even in the
presence of counsel but with some obligation on the part of
defendants to answer questions put to them, or to risk that their
silences may be used against them. This may sound shocking, but
Dean Wigmore many, many years ago suggested that the fifth
amendment was not sacrosanct. The great Justice Benjamin Cardozo suggested the same thing-that a reasonable method of interrogation with an allegation to respond or run the risks of silence
would not turn our common law into a shambles. That's the
second method. I don't think it's likely to be adopted-in the next
six months-and so maybe the Attorney General's suggestion was
the wiser.
The third method would be for the Supreme Court of the
United States of America to do something about it. And I'm not
now criticizing the Court. You know whenever a prosecutor or
cop says anything about the Court, there's something "unpatriotic"
about it. Happily, though, I've been here and I know that cats
may look at kings. I've heard Yale Kamisar criticize Attorney
General Katzenbach. I guess I too can be the cat criticizing the
kings-the Supreme Court-without being disloyal, without being
unpatriotic. And I suggest to you that what the Supreme Court
can do is very simple. I don't think they're going to do it, but
what they could do is simply to reverse Escobedo. Emerson, I remind you, said, "Consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." I
know there are no little minds in that temple of justice in
Washington. I am sure that they are not worried by consistency.
We've seen that over and over again. I suggest to you further that
when one talks in terms of the Court reversing itself it sounds
monolithic and difficult. But I think if one talks in terms of people
it is easier. Five Justices in Escobedo said, in effect, "Four Justices
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are wrong. They are not giving you the law. We five are right. We
are giving you the law." And I suggest that all we need for reversal
of Escobedo is that instead of five Justices saying four Justices are
wrong, we need five Justices who will now say five Justices were
wrong. And, this said, Escobedo is reversedl That is not impossible:
We have a change in personnel. One of the five Justices the
Justice who wrote the opinion, is no longer on the bench. We have
in his place a Justice whom I do not know. I know nothing about
him except what the papers have said. But I do know that when
he came up for Senate confirmation, the New York Times quoted
him as saying that he felt that reasonable interrogation by police
of suspects was, in the words quoted in the Time, "absolutely
essential." And so I think that if the Court will swallow hard, and
will look at the chaos that has been created, I think the possibility
of reversing Escobedo is not beyond hope. I think it would be
sound. I won't get deeply into this on legal grounds, but I think
that finding that the sixth amendment applies outside of the
courtroom (in the station house) requires the straining of about
a dozen separate words in the sixth amendment itself, words which
clearly and unequivocably refer to a trial in the courtroom. So I
suggest that a sound basis for reversal exists.
The Attorney General's letter would not have been necessary
if either there were to be a constitutional amendment, or if the
Supreme Court itself were to reverse its action in Escobedo and
were to remove the constitutional strictures on legislation. Then
we would be able to have that which I would love to see (and that
which I think would be sound as a bell): orderly legislation,
legislation that the American Law Institute or the American Bar
Association or some other group may suggest; a legislative pattern
for dealing with this balance of fairness to society and fairness to
the defendants.
I remind you, in closing, that the great judge, Henry Friendly,
in the October issue of the California Law Review wrote a brilliant article calling for legislative action in so many of these areas
rather than judicial action. I suggest to you that a proper, strong
Supreme Court opinion could remove this area of interrogation
from sixth amendment strictures and simultaneously could insist
upon legislation being enacted, "with all deliberate speed" to
deal intelligently with the question of interrogation of defendants.
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COMMENTS BY DEAN EDWARD L. BARREtr, JR.*
Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and gentlemen: I do not propose to
talk this morning much about the substance of Yale Kamisar's
paper. I think that debating about the Attorney General's letter
is somewhat irrelevant though I realize that Yale loves debate. I
suspect that the Attorney General's letter demonstrates two things.
One is that there is great risk in writing letters, especially if you
think they're going to be subjected to Mr. Kamisar's debating
techniques. The other is that an academic who takes a public post
puts himself in this very peculiar position that his academic friends
regard him as too practical and his professional colleagues complain about his being in the "ivory tower." What I would rather do
is to try just for a moment to look at some of the basic issues which
underlie this whole controversy with respect to confessions and
the role of counsel at the police station.
There are two fundamental questions here. One of them is
just what the role of the lawyer is in our system of administration
of criminal justice. What do we want to use the lawyer for? He
is a scarce and, in this audience I can safely say, valuable commodity. The other and more fundamental question, of course, is
the one which underlies all of this discussion-to what extent do
we want, in the administration of the criminal law, to rely upon
incriminatory statements made by people suspected of crime?
Now, just for a moment, let us look at the first question. The
conventional rule of the lawyer as we've known it in the criminal
process, of course, has been at the stage when the case gets to the
court in some fashion. In modem times we all recognize that the
lawyer may get into the case first in terms of negotiating, finding
out the facts, the charge, talking to the prosecutor, trying to
convince the prosecutor that there may be some reasonable disposition of this case short of the crime that was charged in the
indictment. Or, he does his investigation and discussions and prepares to take the case to court to try it. The discussion more recently, however, has been about the lawyer as being a man who
gets down to the police station as the policeman brings the suspect
in to represent him at that point. Well, what can the lawyer do
at that point? I suggest that really there is only one thing he can
* Dean, University of California School of Law, Davis.
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do and that is to say to his client whom he's just acquired, "Don't
tell anybody anything until I find out what this is all about. And
then after I have had a chance to find out what this is all about
we will decide what we're going to do from this point on." It this
is all that the lawyer can do and generally this will be all that he
can do, is this what we want to use lawyers for and can we use
them for it? I suggest that in the generality of cases, at least as we
have organized our bar to date, we can't have the lawyer at the
police station. And this is at least as true for the rich man as the
poor man. If you have your counsel who represents you and a
policeman picks you up at two o'clock this afternoon and takes you
into the police station, you say, "I want to talk to my lawyer," and
you get on the phone. In the first place, he may be in court so you
won't even get to talk to him. If you do get to talk to him, he is apt
to say, "Well, I can't come down and see you right now because
I have to be in court. I have an appointment." His life as a lawyer
means that he must be in other places and can't be in the police
station at any particular point in time.
I had the privilege of being in Sweden a year and a half ago
discussing some of these problems in a system in which the state
provides lawyers to all people without regard to their financial
means. I talked to the leading criminal lawyer in Stockholm and
asked him, "Well, now under your system the defendant can get
in touch with the lawyer almost immediately after his arrest. If
your client calls you up, do you go down to the police station for
the interrogation" He said, "No. If I did that I couldn't do the
job I'm supposed to do of representing my clients in court because I can't do both of these jobs on any regular basis. Occasionally I do in a great case, a big case, an unusual situation but not in
the generality of instances."
It is by no means clear that it would be useful for society to
say that we have to train enough lawyers so that we can have lawyers that rush down to the police station or that, even worse, become real "jail-house lawyers" spending their days around the jails
so that they can counsel people as they come in.
What we want to use the lawyer for depends on our goal. If our
goal is to see that all persons are adequately advised that they
have no need to talk, that they are not obligated to talk to the
police, there are certainly much more efficient and economical
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means of accomplishing this objective than providing the relative
scarce commodity of lawyer time to communicate this message.
Madison Avenue could suggest to us many means of communicating to all people who come into police stations the simple
fact that they don't have to talk to the policeman. We could use
signs, we could do all sorts of things, in fact we could even have a
very persuasive lawyer record the message and play it for every
defendant who comes in if all we want at that point is for him to
be advised of his privilege not to talk.
Another problem which does relate to the equality point discussed by Professor Kamisar, if this is the goal, if all we are talking
about is adequately advising the person who has been arrested
of his rights, in that the net result is apt to be that the innocent,
confused, average citizen who happens to come in contact with the
law will hear the message and then proceed to talk to the policeman. Perhaps not the rich defendant but the experienced defendant will perceive the message much more clearly and perhaps will
not talk to the police unless he is convinced that it's to his own
advantage. Hence, if all we are talking about is advice, I'm not
sure that advice gets us over the basic equal protection hurdle, because that mere advice is apt to leave the situation much as at present-the poor, more often than others, will, having been advised,
persist in talking to the police.
All this suggests that probably our underlying problem here
is not the lawyer problem, not the advice problem, but the second
question posed above. It is our ambivalence on the basic question
as to whether we think that we should use, at all, in the process of
administration of criminal justice, inculpatory statements made by
persons who are under arrest or in some form of police custody.
The real question here is do we want confessions? Do we want
police to interrogate? Do we want to have this kind of evidence?
Now this question is one of the most extraordinarily difficult
social questions that we have to face. It is made difficult by a
host of things not the least of which is that we have relatively few
facts from which to draw conclusions.
There are two general factual areas in which we are remarkably uninformed. The first is one that was alluded to by Mr. Kuh.
To what extent can we cope with the problems of administration
of criminal justice without the use of confessions? We do not
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even know how many cases depend upon interrogation. We do not
know what would happen in terms of the case load without confessions. We have very little data which is useful at this stage to
help us to know what is the dimension of the problem. We can
speculate but really don't know at all the extent to which alternative methods of investigation could take the place of interrogption and what these methods would cost. The economic cost could
be very high. Not only would there be increased cost of policing,
but also of maintaining a larger judicial establishment. One of the
consequences of eliminating confessions would probably be a
reduction in the cases disposed of on guilty pleas. I once did a
little computing in California which suggested that if you reduced
the guilty in felony cases by ten per cent, it would require an increase on the order of thirty per cent in all of the courts, prosecutors, public defenders and associated personnel dealing with
the trials of felony criminal cases in California. In addition to
economic cost there is another kind of cost, which is: probably the
only effective way to deal with the situation would be to greatly
increase police manpower to create a much more pervasive police
establishment, in order to get the evidence which will solve crimes.
Such an increase then disturbs other values of a civil libertarian
concern. I must say my own reaction is that if there were a policeman on every corner, I would feel much more inhibited and
much more as though I were living in some kind of a police state
than the present system gives me. Hence, this is another problem
worth worrying about.
So we have very few facts about what the present situation
actually is and therefore even fewer facts about what are the
predictable results of alternative courses of action. We start from
the fact that, whether it has been legal or illegal, justified or not,
the process of criminal investigation by interrogation of suspected
persons in custody has always gone on, not only in this country,
but in almost every other country, civilized or otherwise. An attempt to eliminate or drastically reduce the use of confessions is
to change past practice whether it represents a change in past law
or not. I would be happier about today's debate then, if we were
talking as intelligently as possible about this direct issue. If you
once decide that reasonable police interrogation is necessary,
desirable and constitutional, then it would be unfortunate to
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waste all the valuable time of lawyers trying to introduce them
into police stations to tell people that they do not have to talk.
We can communicate that message in other ways. But if we decide
our real objective is to eliminate the use of interrogation in
custody and resultant confessions, it would be much more economical and, on the whole, much more satisfactory to do it directly.
We could just say that confessions obtained from people in police
custody cannot be used in the prosecution of criminal cases, and
then see what happens. Such a direct approach would also be more
conducive to realizing the equal protection values that are being
talked about than the indirect one of providing lawyers at the
station.
One other comment on the equal protection problem-the
only one I want to make-is that it is a little more complicated
than we tend to view it. And it is suggested by the fact that even
under the current case law, which entitles the person who has
the money to hire a lawyer and to have him at his side if he requests him at the police station, the man with the money can
always produce the lawyer as a matter of fact. As I suggested
earlier, his lawyer may not be immediately available. Under the
best of circumstances by the time he has called a lawyer and gotten one from some downtown office down to the police station to
talk to him, a good deal of police interrogation may have taken
place. If we say then that in order to satisfy equal protection a
lawyer must be provided for the man who can afford to have a
lawyer, the only practicable way really of doing this in large cities
is going to be to station somebody like a public defender in the
police station so that whenever a poor man comes in and is arrested, here will be this man to talk to him. Here the result would
be the other way around. The man who didn't have the money
would have a lawyer present immediately and the rich man
ordinarily would not. If we went that route, the next step would
likely be to forget all about equal protection and provide a lawyer
at the station for everybody. If we really mean that arrested persons must have immediate advice, the only practicable way is to
have some publicly or privately financed lawyer who is there all
the time to provide this advice to everyone.
And, of course, the lawyer problem does illustrate another
one of the equal protection problems which is always troublesome.
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The man who has to pay for something makes the decision as to
whether it is useful to him. A man will decide in particular cases
whether it is worth spending his own money to have a lawyer
under the circumstances. If the state is providing the lawyer, however, this factor is eliminated and you tend to have more of a
waste of resources by the defendant asking for the lawyer in every
case.
The problem of wasted resources was highlighted for me in
a related context when I took a visiting prosecutor from Denmark
to see a trial in Oakland, California. We went down to the
municipal court to see a trial and we wandered into a court room
where a man was being tried for the minor offense of public
drunkenness. As a matter of fact, he had been arrested while
drunk in the ladies room of a hotel. He had demanded, as he was
entitled to under the California law, a jury trial and he had
demanded the services of a public defender. So here was the whole
panoply, the jury, judge, prosecutor, public defender, and defendant, and you didn't have to be in the room five minutes to
realize that everybody, including the defendant, realized that this
was just a show, that it would serve no useful purpose. He had
gotten annoyed because he had been arrested several times, so he
said, "the system is going to spin its wheels for me" and all of this
was happening for no real purpose. I suspect that to a degree, provision of counsel at the station house for the sole purpose of
advising a man not to talk until some later point at which a lawyer
can look into the case is going to be somewhat as wasteful.
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Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and gentlemen. Our friend, Professor
Kamisar, has performed another neat forensic feat in proving to us
the paradox that the Supreme Court has left the Attorney General
behind, but that the Attorney General is not behind the Supreme
Court. Professor Kamisar has operated with his usual high precision instrument, which is sort of a mixture of tomahawk and
surgeon's scalpel. I think that on the issue of poverty and criminal
justice, he has caught the Attorney General off guard. The
General had it coming. But query: Is that the issue? Are we talking
about poverty? No, we're not. Of course most criminal offenders
are poor. We have to take it into consideration, but it is a collateral matter. Of course, poverty is an issue in this country in
every matter. But in criminal justice we are not talking about
poverty as such. We are talking about something completely different. Well then, are we talking about criminal interrogation?
No. I'm suggesting we are not even talking about that, though perhaps criminal interrogation is that hole in the tire of Professor
Kamisar's getaway car, through which the accumulated over-pressurized air comes out, and perhaps it has always come out at that
spot. This is the sore spot in the administration of criminal
justice. In fact, think back for a moment to medieval times when
the entire system of criminal justice was tagged and identified by
this one issue: the inquistorial system. That means the questioning
system. And today, in comparative terms, we are talking about the
inquisitorial system abroad, and the adversary system here. The
system has never been one hundred per cent inquisitorial. (I
should say one hundred proof, in this state.) For that matter, the
adversary system in this country has not even been one hundred
proof. Both systems have worked with the inquiry upon the defendant. It just so happens that we have professed in our Constitution, and perhaps we now mean it, that a defendant shall not be
forced to incriminate himself.
Perhaps confessions are not statistically significant. I have a bit
of experience in that. You see, I once was a police officer and I
walked the beat and stalked my prey and I got my men and
* Professor of Law and Director of Comparative Criminal Law Project, New
York University School of Law.

KENTUcKY LAW jou NAL

[Vol. 54,

sometimes even my women. I haven't beat anybody up, though I
was once terribly tempted to beat up an arrogant Nazi war
criminal. There are, however, in my experience, situations in
which a confession is necessary for conviction-not for medieval
reasons: You see in the middle ages we needed confessions to
cleanse the perpetrator's soul. At that time it was regarded as immoral to hang somebody unless he had cleansed his soul by confession. No, today we need some sort of verbal cooperation for purely
investigatory reasons. How do we get it without amending the
fifth amendment? And I should like to say it would be a worldwide shock if we were to amend the fifth amendment today because, at this moment, while we are talking about amending the
fifth amendment, several countries abroad are following our
example and are creating a fifth amendment. As of April of this
year, [1965] German criminal procedure operates with new procedural safeguards, including a now virtually fool-proof self-incrimination privilege, with an exclusionary rule. Of course, we
have indoctrinated them in this respect. Shall we reverse ourselves at this point?
Let me make a supposition. Let us suppose that Escobedo and
the rest mean what some prosecutors fear: that no question may
be asked absent counsel and that no questioning may take place
absent a warning about the self-incrimination privilege. Let's add
a third "bugaboo," and that is McNabb-Mallory, to wit: let us suppose that there must be prompt production before a magistrate.
Now I didn't say that the Escobedo case must be interpreted or can
be interpreted as saying that there must be no questioning. The
Court held nothing of that sort. The fifth amendment does not
prohibit questioning. That's one thing we have to keep in the
back of our minds. But what is so frightening about Escobedo as
understood in these terms? Is it so frightening that perhaps the
great American public may wake up some day and learn, without
being told by an attorney, that they have a self-incrimination
privilege? How dumb do we think the great American public really
is? Should we not suppose that the word will ultimately get
around to the effect that there is a self-incrimination privilege,
that there is a right to counsel? Well then, what are we really
scared of?
I suggest that the one thing we are scared of is the negativeness
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of the Supreme Court's pronouncements. Think back. The
Supreme Court's pronouncements have always been negative
because the Supreme Court does not write a code for us. The
Supreme Court stakes outer limits. That is its task. It was designed
to do that. Now it sounds, of course, terribly negative when all
the time we are told, like we were told by mommy and daddy as
little children, "don't do this and don't do that." Let me demonstrate with another example. Suppose you were to draw a map of
a given countryside, say a map of the region between here and
Spindletop Hall (which I missed several times), and let us suppose
that this map were to be framed entirely in terms of quasi
Supreme Court decision, i.e., here it says "this is no road," there
it says "this is no hill." Could we travel by that map; could we find
Spindletop Hall? No, and for that matter, a few guiding stars
coming from the Supreme Court are not enough for law enforcement operating with that kind of map. We need a good map. How
do we get this map? I suggest we have to draft it-we, meaning
those of us who are not judges.
What does such a map look like? Well, when it comes to map
making in criminal law, I think we ought to take a look at the
continental model because they have made criminal law and
criminal procedure and other law maps for centuries. We have
not. I would like to suggest, and I could spend an hour explaining
it, that what is taking place in the American Law Institute in
drafting a model pre-arraignment procedure code is "hack work."
It does not amount to a law map. It is a record of a few highlights,
badly drafted at that. No, I'm afraid we have to look to the
continental system.
What are we likely to find in the continental system in terms
of map making? We will find, first of all, that a map is something
which is drafted on one and the same scale. In making it, some
basic principles have been adhered to consistently. A map must
not be inconsistent. I suggest that if we were to go out at this
moment to solve the problem of self-incrimination, of questioning
at the station house, without looking at the rest of the law, we
would not be good map makers in law. We would be overemphasizing something and forgetting about the rest of it. I think
in Dean Barrett's statement it came out quite nicely, what dangers
we encounter when we are working on one thing without thinking
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of the others. Comparison then, once again, may be of considerable
help. Now, there is no fool proof system anywhere, but there are
a few hints abroad that may be of great help to us. And now to
the specific problem:
Firstly, I note that in almost every other system the moment
of arrest is postponed. "Probable cause" is not enough for an
arrest in either France or Germany or most other European
countries. "Urgent suspicion" is required. In terms of their
supreme court decisions, "urgent suspicion" means a little more
than "probable cause." Such a jacked-up requirement may force
the police to do a bit more leg work. Yes, it is possible to do more
leg work.
Secondly, we have placed entirely too much emphasis on the
arrest point. I submit that an invasion of personal privacy is much
more serious than an invasion of property rights. Continental law
emphasizes the possible invasion of property rights, i.e., it prefers
search and seizure over arrest. This is something we have never
considered. If we were to consider that, I should think we might
also cut down on the need for questioning.
Thirdly, the continental system has created a unique institution
which bears looking into. Our own institution of the United
States Commissioner, or the magistrate, or the hearing judge, has
its counterpart in the continental system: the investigating magistrate. An investigating magistrate combines the adjuncts of an
effective public defender with those of an effective police inquisitor. He is trained in law enforcement. He has taken courses
is psychology. He is also a representative of the great public. He's
all that wrapped in one. You might say, in his ideal form, he is
an "ombudsman" of criminal justice. We lawyers have been talking
about the ombudsman as a unique institution, as a fourth branch
of government. But perhaps there is no point in government at
which an ombusdsman is as much needed as in criminal procedure,
immediately following arrest. I must warn that we could conceiveably turn this new officer of justice into the worst possible
inquisitor. Here, as elsewhere, we must proceed with prudence.
Fortunately, we have a Supreme Court set above us who occasionally will nudge us if we go too far. But we must become active.
We must find a solution. I am suggesting, as a matter of fact, that
developments are driving us to criminal procedure map making,
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and to looking into the possibilty of an ombudsman of criminal
procedure.
All this, of course, is likely to be expensive. I am fully aware
of that. Yes, we may have to double or to triple our existing
facilities. We may have to build an entirely new type of station
house, one with consultation rooms for the public defenders, and
a courtroom to which any arrested person (of a given category, say
those charged with felony) is brought. Our present station houses
do not permit either consultation or a judicial interview of the
arrestee. The new criminal justice station house will permit the
lawyer-client consultation which the Supreme Court has already
granted to arrestees, and it would permit a judicial interview immediately subsequent to arrest, an interview with a magistrate, or,
as I envisage, an ombudsman of criminal justice. This officer will
extend to the arrestee all the rights a criminal defendant is entitled to. And I should think that the ombudsman, just as does the
investigating magistrate in Europe, will ask questions. He is not
entitled to any answers. But what in the Constitution tells him
not to ask questions? Merely asking the questions may help solve
a given crime. A whole school of psychiatric learning has gone
into the theory of the soliloquy. The questioner may be talking to
himself, but the reactions of the person addressed may well be of
some significance. They may not be, particularly in the presence
of counsel. But this is the ultimate limit we reach. We cannot
force anybody to respond. I submit that in the hands of a judicial
officer, and in view of the self-incrimination privilege, and an
applied right to counsel, the extension of questions to an arrestee
is perfectly proper. But I am afraid to extend this power to the
police, absent counsel.
This is the end of my brief remarks. Obviously this is a curt
summary of an enormously large topic, which requires attention
to technical detail, and which cannot be solved by mere generalities. I should just like to add one thing: I have hopes that this
conference may have an impact on the future. A few of you may
be aware of the fact that more than one hundred and sixty years
ago, just a few miles from here, in Frankfort, Kentucky, the first
American book on criminal law was published, by Toulmin and
Blair. In my opinion, this was one of the most significant events
in the history of American criminal law. I should think, therefore,
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that this state has started a tradition for good practices, and the
tradition has been kept up at your faculty by a giant of our
criminal law fraternity, Roy Moreland. All this leads me to conclude that perhaps this state would like to go forward and start
experimenting in criminal justice in a constitutionally permissible
manner, for the good of the whole nation.
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Thank you Professor Batt. Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. President:
Perhaps I shouldn't say this, but the subject matter and the
presence of the Chief Justice impels me to do so. John W. Davis
once made a speech on "Appellate Advocacy" in the presence of
one of the Justices of the Supreme Court and he started off this
way: "Who would listen to the weary discourse of the fisherman as
to the effectiveness of various types of lures if the fish himself could
be induced to talk?"
I think that the subject before us is the most important problem that exists in our legal system today. I do not propose to discuss the correspondence between the Attorney General and Judge
Bazelon. I read that correspondence some months ago. I do not
propose to read it again during this incarnation. But that correspondence, as it was treated by Professor Kamisar today, serves a
valuable function because it provides a basis for consideration of
an extremely serious issue.
What is happening in this area of the law is not too different
from what is happening in other areas of the law. Flesh and blood
are being put on our ideals. This is true, for example, with respect
to Brown v. Board of Education. This is true with respect to Baker
v. Carr, and is true in all areas of criminal procedure. And putting
on flesh and blood-coming face-to-face with our ideals and looking them in the teeth-is not always a comfortable process, nor is
it always an easy one.
There is no harder job for any judge, from the Chief Justice
of the United States down through every judge of this state and
every state, than to vindicate procedural rules when you are sometimes fully aware that the defendant is guilty. Yet the procedural
rules must be maintained if we are to have the kind of legal
system that we want, and that our Constitution demands.
In this area of criminal law the relevant ideal has been that
an officer may not arrest without a warrant unless he knows that
an offense has been committed and has reasonable cause to think
that the arrested person committed it. Most of the states have
provided by statute that an arrested person must be taken "immediately," "forthwith," "at once," "without unreasonable delay"
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before a magistrate who is to determine whether or not probable
cause existed for the arrest. It is no secret that in Illinois the
statutory command has been disregarded, and I think the same is
true of almost all of the other states. The McNabb-Mallory rule,
which requires immediate production, or something very close to
immediate production, has simply not been followed generally in
the state courts. There has been delay, and during that period of
delay there have been confessions, and those confessions have been
admitted in evidence in the state courts. That is the condition as
it exists today.
Now, lets pause and consider where we are with respect to the
right to counsel and how we got there. Parenthetically it always
surprises me a little that discussion of this problem always seems
to focus on the right to counsel, although it would seem to me that
the privilege against self-incrimination might also have been an
available starting point. But considering the right to counsel:
Until 1938 in the federal courts in the United States, the constitutional right to counsel meant no more than the right to employ
counsel if the defendant was able to afford to hire a lawyer. It
meant no more than that. Then in 1938 Johnson v. Zerbst was
decided. I think Mr. Justice Black wrote that opinion. That's
1938, which is not very long ago. Of course, most of the states,
and I can't resist saying this, most of the states had been furnishing
counsel to indigent defendants long, long before 1938 and Johnson
v. Zerbst. The federal government lagged behind. Then came
Gideon v. Wainwright which applied Johnson v. Zerbst to the
states. And then Escobedo, which projected (and no one knows
just how far) the right to counsel into the police station under
certain circumstances, and under just what circumstances has not
yet been determined.
I think of another paper that Professor Kamisar has written. I
should say that I interrupted him during his talk so that he might
explain his reference to "the mansion house and the gate
house," because I was afraid that it might otherwise be lost on
those of you who do not live intimately with new developments
in criminal law. In that paper he pointed out as he explained
today, that very often the elaborate procedure that we set up for
the conduct of a criminal trial is realistically meaningless, because the guilt of the defendant has already been determined in
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the station house in the process of station house interrogation.
While we assign counsel when the defendant comes into court, and
give him all of the other protections, the most significant part of
the trial has, in a sense, been concluded.
When it is suggested that the right to counsel be projected into the station house, there is an immediate response. Many voices
answered-some stridently, but I think none more eloquently than
Mr. Kuh answered this morning-saying that it is not possible to
enforce criminal law unless station house interrogation in the
absence of counsel is permitted. I think I share that view, but I
don't know. As Dean Barrett pointed out, there is no empirical
data. There just isn't anything very worthwhile to indicate what
has happened and what would happen if station house interrogation were not permitted save in the presence of counsel. It
scares me, but I don't know.
The other evening coming to Lexington I read something
written by David Acheson, formerly United States Attorney for
the District of Columbia, where they have been operating under
McNabb-Mallory, strictly enforced. He said this: "The effect of
Supreme Court reversals on crime in the street cannot be demonstrated merely by the indignant protest of a prosecutor or police
official whose pride has been understandably hurt by judicial
criticism." And he commented further, "The war against crime
does not lie on this front. Prosecution procedure has at most only
the most casual connection with crime. Changes in court decisions
and prosecution procedure have about the same effect on the
crime rate as would have an aspirin on a tumor of the brain."
I wish I could offer a solution. There is no problem that has
troubled me more, that has made me more unhappy than this one
in these recent years. My own notion is that effective prosecution,
as I indicated, is not compatible with a prohibition of station house
interrogation or with the presence of a lawyer during station
house interrogation. I'm not so much interested in this equal protection point, because I do not believe that a rich man can get a
lawyer to go to the police station at the relevant times. I know
that I would not often have gone when I was practicing. It would
have to be someone very close to you-a personal friend rather
than just a client-because you have other work to do. You don't
come to the office and sit there and wait for the phone call to go
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to the station. Moreover, the notion of a disadvantage between
rich and poor at the station house does not cover the whole problem, especially when we consider that many statements are made
in the squad car on the way to the police station house. At least,
that is what the records which come to us show.
Now, I am troubled. I think alternatives are needed. I think
some have been suggested here: police interrogation in the open,
in the presence of a magistrate, with tape recording, with television. I see no reason why we should limit a magistrate or a
United States Commissioner to the sole function of determining
probable cause on arrest. I think that such a judicial officer could
be utilized effectively in the solution of this problem.
It would be wise, I think, to look to other legal systems. I suggested a year or so ago to a meeting of some of your judges here in
Kentucky that perhaps the fifth amendment might have to be
modified with respect to comment, if the right to counsel was to
be projected into the police station and one judge responded,
"Let's do this the American way." Well, I went home feeling
rather uncomfortable. I do see an impasse that I find difficult of
solution, given our existing constitutional doctrines.
But I do think that there is tremendous value in attempting to
put flesh and blood on our ideals, rather than in keeping them up
there inscribed on the walls, to be pointed at with pride on ceremonial occasions. And if the ideas are too broadly stated to meet
essential practical objectives, then I would suggest that the ideals
must be modified and that we ought to be frank. This is the
significance of the work that the Supreme Court of the United
States is doing, establishing and enforcing rules of criminal procedure. It is hard for state court judges to realize it, but I think
that the Court is writing one of the finest chapters in its history.
We are so close to it, that we do not have the necessary perspective.
The perspective, I would venture, would come fifty to one
hundred years from now when it is realized that the Court has
frankly faced up to extremely difficult problems and has done its
utmost to enforce the ideals that we profess.
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